The Media and Torture

Go. Read.

Greenwald and Goodman

At the Izzy Awards.

More from PEW

The internet and the 2008 (Presidential) campaign.

"The Death and Life of Great American Newspapers"

From Nichols & McChesney. Article here. Interview here. Both are worth the time.

State of the News Media

The 2009 Report, from the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism.

Stewart Smackdown

Jon Stewart takes on business reporting below (for unedited versions of the full interview, go here).

The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c

Intro - Brawl Street: Get Ready to Buy Low! And Sell Die

Daily Show Full Episodes
Important Things w/ Demetri Martin

Political Humor
Jim Cramer

UPDATE: From Jay Ackroyd: "So we're at the point that a comedian has to take a break from fart sounds and funny faces to dish out some journalism. Because otherwise, there isn't any? Journalism, that is."

UPDATE II: From Glenn Greenwald:

That's the heart of the (completely justifiable) attack on Cramer and CNBC by Stewart. They would continuously put scheming CEOs on their shows, conduct completely uncritical "interviews" and allow them to spout wholesale falsehoods. And now that they're being called upon to explain why they did this, their excuse is: Well, we were lied to. What could we have done? And the obvious answer, which Stewart repeatedly expressed, is that people who claim to be "reporters" are obligated not only to provide a forum for powerful people to make claims, but also to then investigate those claims and then to inform the public if the claims are true. That's about as basic as it gets.

Today, everyone -- including media stars everywhere -- is going to take Stewart's side and all join in the easy mockery of Cramer and CNBC, as though what Stewart is saying is so self-evidently true and what Cramer/CNBC did is so self-evidently wrong. But there's absolutely nothing about Cramer that is unique when it comes to our press corps. The behavior that Jon Stewart so expertly dissected last night is exactly what our press corps in general does -- and, when compelled to do so, they say so and are proud of it.

Read the Rest HERE.

The Politics of Seating Charts

Go see Nate, for what's going on here:

Media, Recession and Poverty

From FAIR and Neil deMause, with special guest appearance. . . . .

Reformation versus Transformation?

Of late, we've seen a resurgence on the political left of the term "progressive."  This I've found problematic, in no small part because even during the so-called Progressive Era, there was no single progressivism, but many (often contradictory) progressivisms.  Nate Silver suggests we distinguish between two strains of modern progressivism -- the rational and the radical.  In some ways, he's really reaching back to an older distinction between urban progressivism and rural populism, but there's more at work here.  I find a lot to argue with in his formulation, but you should click through and read his post.  His summary chart below.

Problems with Polling, Part 427

From Pollster.com:

Much of what pollsters offer to the world as "public opinion" is in reality hypothetical, based on giving respondents information that many in the general public may not have and then immediately asking respondents for their reaction to that information.

Such results can be illuminating, but pollsters recognize that feeding respondents information means the sample no longer represents the American public and what Mark calls its "pre-existing" opinion. Unfortunately, many pollsters fail to acknowledge the hypothetical nature of such results, and instead treat them as though they represent the current state of the public's views.

The problem with this kind of approach is illustrated in the case that Mark discussed in his post, dealing with the "card check" bill, the proposed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) concerning the authorization of unions in the workplace.

The vast majority of Americans, one can reasonably assume, have little to no knowledge of the provisions of the bill. Thus, to measure "public opinion" on the issue, pollsters feel they need to tell respondents what the bill is all about. A Republican pollster explained the bill one way, a Democratic pollster another way, and - to no one's surprise - they ended up with a "public opinion" that reflected their respective party's position on the issue.

While one may argue the relative merits of the questions used by the two pollsters, the main point is that informing the public of any major policy proposal is intrinsically biased. Pollsters have to decide what is important among all the various elements of the proposal, and they can often come up with quite different conclusions. This problem applies to public policy pollsters as well, who - we can reasonably assume - have no partisan agenda, but who nevertheless can produce what appear to be partisan results.

Such problems have multiplied with the recent public policy polling on the bailout proposals for Wall Street and for the auto industry, and on the stimulus plan being considered by Congress. Most pollsters assume the public has little specific knowledge of such proposals, and thus pollsters provide respondents specific information to measure the public's (hypothetical) reaction to the proposal.

When CNN described the proposal to bailout the auto industry by characterizing it as "loans in order to prevent them from going into bankruptcy," in exchange for which the companies would produce plans "that show how they would become viable businesses in the long run," it found a 26-point margin in favor (63 percent to 37 percent). But when an ABC/Washington Post poll only a few days earlier had mentioned the word "bailout" in its question and did not refer to plans leading to the companies becoming viable, the poll showed a 13-point majority against the proposal (55 percent to 42 percent).

Again, one can debate the relative merits of the two questions, but the tendency of pollsters is to say that each set of results provides different insights into the dynamics of the public's views on this matter. In short, each provides a picture of potential public reaction to the proposal, if the proposal is framed to the general public in the way each polling organization presented the issue to its respondents.

That distinction is generally lost in the news reports. . . .

Photographers Discuss Their Photos: Bush Era

Fascinating.

Media Bias?

More here

Footnote of the Day

Article here:

¹ Real Social Scientific Data is a term of art here, which covers the broad category of ‘statistics that are sufficiently entertaining that I really don’t want to look at them too hard.’ This understanding of data is commonly applied (especially in the popular press, but often enough in academia too), although rarely acknowledged in explicit terms.

The Practice of Control and False Narratives?

Press coverage in the Bush Era:

Live, from DC, it's Tuesday Afternoon

Three Spheres

From Jay Rosen:

. . . one of the problems with our political press is that its reference group for establishing the “ground” of consensus is the insiders: the professional political class in Washington. It then offers that consensus to the country as if it were the country’s own, when it’s not, necessarily. This erodes confidence in a way that may be invisible to journalists behaving as insiders themselves. And it gives the opening to Jon Stewart and his kind to exploit that gap I talked about between making news and making sense. . . .

Now we can see why blogging and the Net matter so greatly in political journalism. In the age of mass media, the press was able to define the sphere of legitimate debate with relative ease because the people on the receiving end were atomized— meaning they were connected “up” to Big Media but not across to each other. But today one of the biggest factors changing our world is the falling cost for like-minded people to locate each other, share information, trade impressions and realize their number. Among the first things they may do is establish that the “sphere of legitimate debate” as defined by journalists doesn’t match up with their own definition.

In the past there was nowhere for this kind of sentiment to go. Now it collects, solidifies and expresses itself online. Bloggers tap into it to gain a following and serve demand. Journalists call this the “echo chamber,” which is their way of downgrading it as a reliable source. But what’s really happening is that the authority of the press to assume consensus, define deviance and set the terms for legitimate debate is weaker when people can connect horizontally around and about the news.

Read the rest.

Keys to Successful Punditry

The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c

Pundit School

Barack Obama Interview
John McCain Interview

Sarah Palin Video
Funny Election Video

Media Coverage of Gaza and the Economy

Blame it on Your Childhood

Some recent scholarship on why people vote.

Some Choice Bits

In no order, and without attribution (you'll have to read your colleagues' posts to find out), here are a few selections from your final exam thingies that I thought especially noteworthy:

One can make the argument, I believe, that in this election season the Tocquevillian motivation and the mimetic attempt to replicate the beliefs of the audience, conjoined. Because paranoia and suspicion towards the nominees for President was so rampant (at least so vocal) among the populace, the media could both replicate those arguments and use them as challenges towards the government. Possibly Tocqueville may have argued that even paranoid suspicion towards the government can play a role in challenging that authority. As the adversarial role is one of power (that increases or decreases as the central government and personal freedom fluxes), that power can be expressed in inanities as well as legitimate challenges. I argue though that this mimetic reproduction of ground roots paranoia in fact delegitimizes the press and those concerns. Power is siphoned and not maintained when those stories are brought up. [This is the] pseudo-journalism of paranoid media.

The media's role is defined by the perception of its viewers. If the people view the media as a poor check on government, it is in effect a poor check on government.

The facts are clear: the media failed to discredit the George W. Bush’s claim that Iraq had WMD, a claim later proven false. Massing and Boehling [Boehlert?] detail how this occurred: the press allowed itself to report falsehoods (therefore failing to uphold being reporters of objective fact) by refusing to investigate the administrations shakier claims (casting aside its duty as a neutral advocate) and stymied dissenting voices (transgressing the commandment to encourage public discussion). It is less clear how the fourth [profit-seeking] and fifth [propagandizing] [of Leighley's models] interacted in 2003, but the presence of both is a certainty. Regardless, the failure of America’s linkage institution resulted in the subservience of democracy; the country embarked on a war informed citizenry would not have fought.

No matter how loud and intense the national conversation gets, it is useless if it get drowned out by an incompetent election process.

[Because] [m]oney buys access. . . some Americans have their voices heard louder th[a]n others. The idea of the media inspiring a national conversation on policy seems futile if the voices of the public do not carry equal weight.

The media is a failed state.

[G]overnment doesn’t use these tools to CONVEY their messages, the[y] use [them] to CONVINCE the public that their ideas and policies should be supported.

Perhaps by complicating the nature of the event itself, of the public discourse, American's can solve the problem that mainstream media posses to democracy. In order for that to occur though, access to politics needs to change. In order to elevate the discourse, more people and more divergent opinions have to somehow enter into the national conversation. Otherness, in a sense, needs to be incorporated into the American dialogue. . . . By opening the inauguration to otherness [in the form of Pastor Rick Warren], by forcing mainstream media to cover a dialogue, by forcing conversation (even if mediated) between liberals and conservatives, pastors and gays, Obama has complicated the American narrative. This is an education for all sides of American values. This is an elevation of the American discourse. . . Exposure, not isolation, is the mechanic of American democracy.

But my favorite line, I have to say, is this:

I expected Rage Against the Machine and got Nickelback.

I hope your semester was more the former than the latter.